Incoherence, incongruence, inconsistency, and indecisiveness are derailing the US-South Africa reset
Howard on Africa In-Brief
A publication of the Center for African Studies, Howard University
Incoherence, incongruence, inconsistency, and indecisiveness are derailing the US-South Africa reset
Written by Charles Ray and Michael Walsh
July 5, 2023
Bottom Line
- The Biden Administration’s Africa strategy was groundbreaking, promising a new era in US-Africa relations with more emphasis on the agency of African nations. Subsequent events, however, have raised questions about the effectiveness of its implementation.
- Events in South Africa relating to that country’s relationship with Russia have been at the forefront of emerging concerns about whether the strategy is being effectively managed.
- The American response to events in South Africa has been incoherent, inconsistent, incongruent, and indecisive. There is a need for more interagency coordination on the American side and a more consistent message to the public regarding the relationship.
In August 2022, the Biden Administration published the US Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa. At the time, it was hailed as a landmark development that struck the right notes in resetting US-Africa relations. However, serious questions have been raised about how the strategy has been implemented in the wake of the breakdown in strategic partnership with South Africa. The Biden Administration needs to quickly get to the bottom of what is standing between their Africa strategy and its successful implementation.
Implementing the new strategy: A problematic kickoff
The Biden Administration has faced challenges with the implementation of the new strategy for some time.
In December 2022, the US-Africa Leaders Summit was held in Washington, DC. That meeting had an ambitious agenda that provided a useful platform to pursue the strategic objectives of fostering openness and open societies and delivering democratic and security dividends. Yet, it was dogged by inconsistencies and indeterminacies.
Before the summit ever kicked-off, the Biden Administration found itself on the defensive. In the preceding weeks, senior officials were publicly criticized for failing to schedule bilateral meetings between President Joe Biden and any of the invited heads of state. As noted in Politico, “Dozens of African leaders are set to attend a major gathering hosted this month by the White House, but so far they shouldn’t expect a one-on-one meeting with President Joe Biden.” This appeared to be a remarkable oversight given the stated desire to broaden and deepen the bench of Africa partners, especially small- and medium-sized African states.
Around the same time, the Biden Administration found itself under fire for inviting Teodora Obiang, the long-time dictatorial leader of Equatorial Guinea. This was problematic as Equatorial Guinea is an authoritarian state whose security forces reportedly “engage in torture and other violence with impunity.” Given that Equatorial Guinea is sandwiched between Sudan and Russia on the Democracy Index, it is not surprising that the invitation brought into question the commitment of the Biden Administration to democracy promotion on the continent.
Of course, this was not the only problem with the selection. As reported by the press, Obiang’s invitation was extended as part of a “quiet campaign to convince the world’s longest-serving dictator to start shedding his ties to China.” And, this appeared to undercut prior messaging that Chinese and Russian presence in Africa would not be the focus of US-Africa relations.
At the summit, more problems emerged when participants made statements that encouraged the drawing of functional divisions in the roles to be played by Americans who are descendants of formerly enslaved Africans and those who are immigrants from African countries in the resetting of US-Africa relations. Those remarks unleashed tensions within America’s African diaspora about whether the new diaspora would benefit more from the resetting of US-Africa relations than the old diaspora.
Ultimately, the Biden Administration failed to respond directly to these concerns, which only led to more questions being asked about the Africa strategy and its implementation.
Relations with South Africa: On shaky ground
Recent events in and relating to South Africa have raised more serious concerns about the implementation of the Africa strategy at the operational and tactical levels.
To be fair, US-South Africa relations were already on a downward trajectory before the strategy was ever released. In March 2022, South Africa was one of 17 African countries that abstained from the UN vote demanding that Russia withdraw its military forces from Ukraine. In April 2022, South Africa was among the 58 nations that abstained from the UN vote to suspend Russia from the Human Rights Council,
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the South African government has claimed to be “non-aligned” in regards to the Ukraine invasion. However, the Ramaphosa Administration has slowly but steadily shifted South Africa ever closer to Moscow. This is despite the fact that Russia is of relatively minor economic importance to South Africa.
The Biden Administration is now struggling to maintain a strategic partnership with a country that appears to be prioritizing strategic partnerships with major power adversaries over the United States.
In February 2023, South Africa once again abstained from a UN vote to condemn Russia for the invasion and call for an immediate withdrawal and end to the fighting. That same month, South Africa hosted a joint military exercise with Russia and China that coincided with the first anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
In May 2023, Reuben Brigety, U.S. ambassador to South Africa, set fire to the tea leaves when he publicly accused South Africa of supplying weapons to Russia despite its professed neutrality in the war. The South African government denied the allegations, but an independent inquiry was established to investigate the matter.
The next month, President Ramaphosa announced plans to invite Vladimir Putin to attend a BRICS meeting to be held in South Africa this summer. This is despite the fact that the International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued an arrest warrant for Putin for alleged war crimes and South Africa is a signatory of the Rome Statute.
These events have not only exposed some chinks in the armor of the Africa strategy. They have shaken confidence in the ability of the United States government to reset relations on the continent.
The American response: Congress steps forward
The Biden Administration has been found wanting for coherence, congruence, consistency, and decisiveness in formulating a response.
While the U.S. ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, accused Russia of “preparing to increase the brutality of its campaign,” no direct comment was reported on the countries that abstained.
Moreover, the Biden Administration’s public response to South Africa’s joint naval exercise with China and Russia was extremely restrained. In an email to Voice of America (VOA), the U.S. State Department said, “We note with concern South Africa’s plan to hold joint naval exercises with Russia and the PRC. We encourage South Africa to cooperate with fellow democracies that share our mutual commitment to human rights and the rule of law.” What private official conversations might have been held with the South Africans are unknown. But, such reticence left some commentators scratching their heads.
In contrast, the response from the legislative branch has been far more aggressive. Citing South Africa’s “deepening military relationship” with Russia, a bipartisan group of senior members of the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate, sent a letter to the U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and other senior administration officials earlier this month.
Signaling a potential retaliatory move, that letter suggested that South Africa is in danger of losing its benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a flagship trade program which grants qualifying countries’ exports preferential access to U.S. markets. Exports to the U.S. from South Africa were nearly $1 billion during the first three months of 2023, making it the second largest beneficiary of the program after Nigeria.
The matter of AGOA: To retaliate or not?
The question of whether to retaliate against the South African government looms large over the National Security Council.
In November 2023, South Africa is supposed to host the AGOA Forum, where U.S. and African officials are to discuss the future of AGOA. African leaders are seeking to extend AGOA before it is slated to expire this year. However, the lawmakers expressed concern about having the forum hosted by South Africa. “We are seriously concerned that hosting the 2023 AGORA Forum in South Africa would serve as an implicit endorsement of South Africa’s damaging support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,” the letter stated.
At the White House, responses to allegations that South Africa transferred weapons to Russia have been erratic and maleficent. Earlier this month, Politico reported that the Biden Administration was "furious with its ambassador” and left “scrambling to salvage” its relationship “with the country.” The unnamed U.S. officials allegedly added that Ambassador Reuben Brigety’s accusations were “overstated” and he may have damaged American interests in the long run. None of these “unnamed officials” disputed the veracity of his statements though. This left many wondering whether this Et tu, Brute moment did more harm than good for U.S. foreign policy on the continent.
On the Hill, it is perhaps not surprising that the loudest responses have been voiced with a fair share of partisanship. A glance at the headlines suggests that the mainstreaming of the crisis opened a policy window for conservatives to attack the Biden Administration on the foreign policy front. With a presidential election on the horizon, it is not surprising that right-leaning media outlets have been used as a platform for Republican policymakers and commentators to raise doubts about the conduct of the Biden Administration in resetting relations with South Africa.
Now, there are unconfirmed rumors that the Biden Administration will ask a third party country to host the November AGOA Forum. Kenya has been thrown around town as a potential candidate. Whether such a move is possible, and what impact it might have on an already strained U.S.-South Africa relationship, is unknown. However, there could be significant unintended consequences.
Looking ahead, South Africa’s “neutral” stance on the Ukraine invasion remains a thorn in the side of the Biden Administration. While many in the executive branch worry that publicizing differences or penalizing “non-aligned” countries like South Africa risks pushing them even closer to Russia, there appears to be a desire in Congress, particularly but not exclusively among Republicans, to take a harder line. The argument over the administration’s “carrot” and the congressional “stick” may only get worse as we get deeper into the election cycle. And, that is likely to further endanger the preservation of the US-South Africa strategic partnership.
The Biden Administration: Time to reset the reset?
The Biden Administration needs to take a step back and consider whether their Zakumi reset is doomed to fail without a context-sensitive redesign.
In October 2022, the Biden Administration published the National Security Strategy. And, it set the right strategic tone for the policy approach of the United States towards the continent. The problem is that the effective implementation of that strategy requires a clear-eyed view of the historical and cultural context, particularly with countries like South Africa.
About a decade ago, Pew Research Center conducted a survey on international attitudes toward the United States. It found that 72 percent of South Africans had a favorable view of the United States. However, that did not necessarily reflect the views of the African National Congress (ANC,) which has been the majority party in government since the end of the apartheid era. And, much has changed in the world since then. In the 2020 poll, only 50 percent of South Africans had a favorable view of the United States.
Because of its economic and political influence in Africa and its diplomatic influence on developing countries in multilateral institutions, South Africa continues to be viewed as a U.S. strategic partner. Yet, high-level bilateral engagement between the U.S. and South Africa has not been as frequent or multifaceted as it has been with many other U.S. strategic partners. This has left the South African government feeling that they are being taken for granted by their American counterparts.
Over the years, the two nations certainly have differed on a wide range of foreign policy issues, from U.S. policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian issue to the Trump Administration’s withdrawal from the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Some ANC officials have publicly expressed anti-U.S. views. There have also been frictions between the U.S. and South Africa in recent years over the issues of racial inequality and violence in the United States.
The African National Congress: An overlooked stakeholder
The Biden Administration may need to reset relations with the African National Congress in order to reset relations with the Ramaphosa Administration.
While American media has been focused on U.S. ambassador’s Reuben Brigety’s statement regarding a possible weapons transfer from South Africa to Russia, South African Broadcasting Company (SABC) recently published the story, “US ambassador slams ANC’s resolution on international relations.”
Responding to the ANC’s 55th resolution on international relations, Brigety said that there was no truth in the AMC accusation that America was responsible for the escalation of the war in Ukraine. “We regard to (sic) the hostilities of the ANC towards the United States of America, our senior government officials noted with great concern the 55th National Congress report resolutions from the ANC’s conference in December,” Brigety said. “I think it is fair to say our government felt these remarks to be outrageous, false, incorrect.”
In view of South Africa’s key foreign policy principles and positions under ANC leadership, this resolution should not have come as a surprise to the White House. South Africa has been a member of the non-aligned movement (NAM) since 1994. And, it sees the war in Ukraine not as one between Russia and Ukraine but a proxy war between Russia and NATO that has its roots in NATO’s eastward expansion.
South Africa continues to place importance on solidarity with “old friends,” and most in the ANC remember support from the Soviet Union during their fight against the apartheid regime. This is not surprising given that ANC leaders remember being left on the U.S. terrorist watch list for over a decade after Nelson Mandela won the Nobel Peace Prize. These memories still matter.
The Biden Administration: A shift in the wrong direction
The Biden Administration has failed to deliver the kind of change in US-South Africa relations that senior leaders once promised to the public.
Less than a year ago, media reports pointed to a “paradigm shift” in US-South Africa relations. This was promised by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken during his visit to South Africa where he spoke of a mutual partnership to advance common values, mutual respect, democracy, and prosperity.
The interagency has long struggled to reach consensus on whether to reframe US-Africa relations through the lens of major power competition. However, Blinken declared that the United States government would not be “preachy and prescriptive with respect to African relations with other powers.”
Subsequent events have challenged those notions in practice. And, the conduct of the United States government during the #LadyRussiagate scandal revealed inconsistencies in how the lens of major power competition is applied to US-South Africa relations across the interagency.
The search for answers: Strategy, implementation, or both?
The Biden Administration needs to get to the bottom of what is wrong with the Africa strategy and its implementation.
The White House should start by asking the question: does the United States government have a good strategy for African relations in current and future contexts? Senior officials may have identified decisions and priorities that are clear and compelling in isolation. However, those may not be well-aligned with internal and/or external realities when treated as a system. Unfortunately, that can lead to tainted insights, wrong conclusions, changing contexts, and misguided choices that result in a nonstrategy.
The White House should continue by asking the question: do key stakeholders have a good understanding of the strategy, a commitment to the strategy, the capacities, and resources to be able to faithfully implement the strategy, and the culture of accountability when that doesn’t happen? Without these reinforcing conditions, the United States government may be faced with an environment that is not conducive to the Africa strategy being successfully implemented.
These are important questions. And, they demand answers before the BRICS Summit in August.
Charles Ray, a member of the Board of Trustees and Chair of the Africa Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, served as U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Republic of Zimbabwe.
Michael Walsh is an Adjunct Fellow at the Center for African Studies at Howard University.
Note: The authors worked together on and contributed equally to this publication.
Editor’s Note: This article was first published in TimesLIVE (South Africa) under the title “OPINION | Is US Africa strategy over the Hill?”
Acknowledgements:
Howard on Africa in Brief is published by the Center for African Studies at Howard University. Contributors include prominent scholars, policy makers, Howard faculty, alumni and graduate students. Our papers provide open access to research and make a global contribution to understanding Africa-related issues. The views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication are solely those of the author(s).